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SOME NOT SO LOST CAUSES OF ACTION*
by
Roger J. Traynor**

Q

NE OF the least dramatic but most interesting problems of the appellate process is more readily stated than answered: What can an appellate court do about seemingly simple cases that threaten to give bad law a
new lease on life if they are decided on the basis of precedents that are illsuited now to govern, sometimes because they were ill-conceived at the outset? Such precedents are more likely to blight the so-called routine cases
than the exceptional case of first impression, and hence the blight is more
likely to go unnoticed.
There are records in abundance of dramatic victories or lost causes in the
law, as in other fields. Still, the recorders, intent on red-letter days of triumph or black-letter days of disaster, have too often neglected the outcome of a controversy in court whose more than transient significance was
lost on them because it was not blatantly dramatized by raging purple polemics in the briefs or royal purple perorations in the opinion.
The significance of such a controversy is not lost upon the judge, however, who must pay close heed to it when it arises within his own court.
He, at least, can bear witness to its noteworthy effect on the law, comparable to a geological change that takes place without any attention-getting
earthquake. A judge's account need not be less useful because it inevitably
bears the imprint of his own bailiwick. Hence, I could readily subsume my
own table of illustrations under the heading of "California Cases I Have
Known," justifying whatever provincialism attends thus speaking from
experience on the ground that experience is the best teacher. Moreover,
provincial experience may have cosmopolitan repercussions in this mobile
country of fifty jurisdictions with many problems in common as well as a
common language.
The cases have been within my province in a double sense, for in the
main they are cases I have been called upon to resolve, a task comparable to
putting a puzzle together so that at last it looks all of a piece. The reader
will see as we examine them how puzzling they can be and how variously
they can riddle the would-be simple solution that offers itself so deceptively as a ratio decidendi. All too often the elusive law that is supposed to
govern the facts is on a rampage threatening to span the distance as a crow
or a plane flies from Texas to California.
The recollection of such cases may serve as a lesson to any lawyer. However formidable the forces that would deter him, he should not abandon
a cause of action as a lost cause if he has reason on his side.
* This article served originally as the most recent in a series of annual lectures in tribute to
Robert G. Storey, Dean Emeritus of the Southern Methodist University School of Law. In his
introduction the author acknowledged Dean Storey's achievements in bringing "so much honor
to the law throughout this country and throughout the world."
** A.B., Ph.D., J.D., LL.D., University of California; LL.D., University of Chicago; LL.D.,
University of Utah; LL.D., Boston College. Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
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We can begin with the most rudimentary example of a not so lost cause
of action, a cause at last won in California though it had long been deemed
lost, given the force of precedent against it. No one had troubled to note
that the precedent was grounded in a dim view of one statute and the oversight of another. I have come to think of this nearly lost cause as a prime
example of the consequences of original sin in the law. Consider the original rule and then see what you think of Father Time as a reason for hallowing it.
The original rule, though probably not unjust in the fact-context of
the original case, served to foster in subsequent cases a backward reading
of a code provision governing contracts that do not make time of the essence. The 1898 court held that a purchaser of real property who defaults
on a single installment must forfeit all his payments.' The court's opinion
evinced a fin de sidcle weariness, for it ignored another relevant code provision against forfeiture. That weariness continued into the twentieth century, leaving its imprint on successive cases for more than fifty years. The
Glock rule, as it came to be called after the original case, developed into a
glockenspiel of such repercussions that it became a favorite source of bar
examination questions. The main thing to remember for a passing grade
was to answer the question irrationally, consonant with prevailing law.
When time was of the essence, the smell of forfeiture pervaded the atmosphere.
In 1949 there came before the Supreme Court of California the first of a
trilogy of cases that became the undoing of the flat metallic bars of the
glockenspiel. By the forties the population rush westward was on, and real
estate prices were trending upward. It was hardly possible to overlook the
evils of forfeiture. The court reviewed the case of buyers who had made
a down payment of $700 in 1941 on a house costing $5,450. They made
regular payments with 6 per cent interest for 57 months. They made permanent improvements exceeding $3,000. Then, during an illness, two of
their checks were dishonored. There was evidence that they were unaware
of such dishonor until they received notice of forfeiture from the seller.
They promptly tendered certified checks for the amounts due, but the seller
refused to accept them, insisting on a return of the property and a forfeiture of all that the buyers had paid.
Father Time's precedents were against the buyers, and so were the magic
words. The contract specified that time was of the essence. Nevertheless it
seemed high time to reread the precedents, and not by gaslight, and to
ruminate just what was so magical about an essence, particularly when
there was no magic answer to the question: Time is the essence of what?
A rereading of the precedents recalled the plaintive inquiry of Madame
X to her Latin lover as to how she looked, and his brutal reply that she
looked all right by candlelight. The Glock precedents had looked bad even
with lights dimmed. In full glare, they compelled a pronouncement of their
demise. So we gave judicial articulation to the neglected code provision
against forfeiture in this opinion:
'Glock v, Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898).
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[W]hen the default has not been serious and the vendee is willing and able
to continue with his performance of the contract, the vendor suffers no
damage by allowing the vendee to do so. In this situation, if there has been
substantial part performance or if the vendee has made substantial improvements in reliance on his contract, permitting the vendor to terminate the
vendee's rights under the contract and keep the installments that have been
paid can result only in the harshest sort of forfeitures. Accordingly, relief
will be granted whether or not time has been made of the essence.!
These words should not send shock waves through a new generation of
lawyers. Lest you become sanguine that all is well, however, I need only
remind you that in this age as in any other, any re-examination of the
law encounters chronic resistance of two sorts. There is the passive resistance of inertia, the very human disposition to let bad enough alone. There
is also the active resistance of diehards who regard precedent itself as a
magic word to conjure up veneration, regardless of whether a precedent has
outlived its usefulness, regardless even of a precedent's original sins of commission or omission. There are still endless problems in need of such comment as a scholar ventured some years ago on the Glock problem:
The law, while looking with righteous abhorrence on forfeitures . . . yet
has been reluctant to intervene with affirmative relief or to formulate any
consistent principle condemning the validity of cut-throat provisions which
...involve forfeiture. Although the law will not assist in the vivisection of
the victim, it will often permit the creditor to keep his pound of flesh if he
can carve it for himself.!
Even the first cautious assault on the Glock rule encountered resistance,
though it was no more than a preliminary advance in a series so circumspect in approach as later to be described with scholarly approval as the
method of one who "warned, then reformed, then refined."' The first step
was to preclude forfeiture against an innocent purchaser willing to go
ahead with the contract. There was a refinement in the following year: we
permitted forfeiture of the down payment of a purchaser who had willfully breached his contract, to the seller's damage.' At the same time we
took care to distinguish the situation of a defaulting purchaser who could
show that there was no damage to the seller, and could therefore claim
restitution to preclude the seller's unjust enrichment.
In the next year such a situation materialized. We allowed restitution of
the down payment of $2,000, less expenses, to a purchaser who repudiated his contract to buy for $18,000, upon a showing that the seller had
promptly sold the land to another for $20,000. Our decision involved a
reconciliation of several code sections, the total effect of which operated to
preclude forfeiture that would unjustly enrich another. We noted how
irrational it was to tolerate such forfeiture against a purchaser who had
2

Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 122, 208 P.2d 367, 371 (1949).
'Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REv. 329, 341 (1921).
' Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 151, 158 (1965).
5
Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950).
6 Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal.. 2d 16, 230 P.2d
629 (1951).
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made partial payment, when a purchaser who breached his contract before
making any payment could escape penalty altogether.
A handful of scholars such as Corbin helped pave the way for these

decisions. The wonder is that there were not more. The tolling of the bells
for Glock was also expedited by the fortuitous circumstance that a trio of

appropriate cases arose in three successive years. Rarely is there so orderly a
procession in the motley parade of cases.
More often than not, in the variegated field of unjust enrichment, a
single case has posed a perplexing problem, in a context of inept or inadequate precedents, that must be definitively resolved in a single step. At the
outset it may be far from certain whether the plaintiff has a not so lost
cause of action, given the inimical magic words of aging precedents. A
judge skeptical of such words may find himself taking a new and searching look at such ancient statutes as the Statute of Frauds. He has no quarrel with the historical premises of a statute that honors certain transactions
only if they are in writing. When it was enacted, men of property were
men of the land, over which hung the long feudal shadow. It was appropriate that transfers of land, once solemnized by livery of seisin, should
thereafter be solemnized by a sealed writing scrolled out with a quill pen.
It was particularly appropriate in an age when people had only some thirty
years in which to live and arrange their affairs before death. The Statute
of Frauds looks immutable on its ancestral premises.
It looks less than immutable when we realize how relatively durable
people have become, how relatively transient now is their relation to the
land. Thus in 1952, when many people had survived two world wars that
had shattered their earth and there were portents of more blasting to come,
the pen might still have been mightier than the sword, but it was giving
way here and there in everyday affairs to audio-visual communication.
Conceivably a man's promise might have legal significance even though he
did not solemnize it with writing. We confronted this possibility in 1952 in
California in a situation wherein A conveyed real property to B in reliance
on B's oral promise to hold the property in trust for A. In a context that
suggested a confidential relationship, B broke the promise. We had to
reckon with a line of cases that denied the remedy of a constructive trust
because there was no actual fraud or no confidential relationship. We had
to reckon with the curious duality in our legal thinking that enables us to
see the actionable wrong of direct injury to another's property and disables us from visualizing the consequences of breaking a promise regarding
such property.
Our analysis, proceeding from that of scholars long preoccupied with this
duality,' led us to the cases that afforded at least the remedy of specific restitution to those who had parted with purchase-money or rendered services
in reliance on an unenforceable oral promise to convey real property. From
there we advanced to the theory that one who conveys in reliance on an
Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalnents Paid, 40
L.J. 8 1013, 1026 (1931).
See I A. ScoTT, TRUSTS

5 44,

at 248 (1939),

and authorities cited.

YALE
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oral promise of another to hold in trust can invoke specific restitution to
preclude the unjust enrichment of the other, when the latter's course of
conduct has made plain his awareness that the property had been given
him in trust.!
The Statute of Frauds can operate still more harshly in protecting one
who breaks a promise to devise real property to another in exchange for the
latter's services. Situations arise where an action for breach of contract or
restitution in quantum meruit cannot make the plaintiff whole. An award
of back pay would not be restoration to one who had prospected and developed a mine on the promise of a share thereof. Such ventures cannot be
reduced to hours and skills measurable by time and motion formulas; the
one who thus engages himself has cut himself off from other opportunities
that cannot be recaptured.
Inevitably, this problem arose before the Supreme Court of California
in the case of Monarco v. Lo Greco." In 1926 Christie Lo Greco, aged 18,
decided to leave the home of his mother and stepfather, Carmela and Natale, and seek an independent living. They persuaded him, however, to stay
with them and participate in a family farm enterprise, then worth $4,000.
They orally promised him that if he stayed home and worked, they would
keep their property in joint tenancy so that it would pass to the survivor,
who would leave it to Christie by will. What happened thereafter is recorded in the opinion:
Christie remained home and worked diligently in the family venture. He
gave up any opportunity for further education or any chance to accumulate
property of his own. He received only his room and board and spending
money. When he married and suggested the possibility of securing some
present interest to support his wife, Natale told him that his wife should
move in with the family and that Christie need not worry, for he would
receive all the property when Natale and Carmela died. . . . The venture
was successful, so that at the time of Natale's death his and Carmela's interest
was worth approximately $100,000.11

Or so it seemed. Shortly before his death, however, stepfather Natale had
secretly arranged conveyances to terminate the joint tenancies and had executed a will leaving all his property to a grandson in Colorado. The latter
received the property after probate and brought an action for partition,
relying on the Statute of Frauds to defeat enforcement of the oral promise
on which Christie had relied in devoting his life to the farm for twenty
years. The grandson argued that no assurance had been given Christie that
he would be protected from the operation of the Statute of Frauds, and
therefore he should not be protected.
We refused to let the grandson invoke the Statute of Frauds. To do so,
we reasoned, would result not only in unconscionable injury to Christie
but in unjust enrichment to the grandson, who should no more than his
ancestor Natale reap the rewards of Christie's labor. On this double basis
the court invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel and imposed a con9

Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal. 2d 693, 697, 242 P.2d 5, 7 (1952).
Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
'lId. at 622, 220 P.2d at 739.
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structive trust on the grandson.
Thus in two cases involving broken oral promises, what once might have
been deemed lost causes under the Statute of Frauds found their way to a
rational outcome. The court advanced to solutions that it reasoned out as
appropriate to the problem in its modern context. In the first case it moved
the property back to the rightful owner through the remedy of specific
restitution. In the second, it moved the property forward to the rightful
taker through the remedy of a constructive trust.
I once took a retrospective view of such equity cases in a piece called
"Unjustifiable Reliance." 1 It was directed at those who are on the ready to
invoke the magic words, justifiable reliance, whenever it suits their purpose,
regardless of whether there has been any real reliance, let alone justifiable
reliance. Nevertheless, the essay also took note that these magic words have
a legitimate place in the law, particularly in property and contract cases
that are their most natural habitat. The facts of a contract case afford a
lively illustration of the legal problem of reliance." They also illustrate the
thesis that a seemingly lost cause may not be lost at all. I remember how
lost it seemed to me until I witnessed its triumph in a majority opinion
with which I disagreed.
The facts added up to a remarkable triangle. There was the usual Jack
and the usual Jill. The unusual third party, however, was a shop that sold
mink coats. These three managed to produce a merry-go-round of reliance
dizzy enough to stagger the soberest judge. One early spring day Jack
squired Jill into the shop, where she soon lost her heart to a handsome mink
coat. The price, said the shop, was $5,000. He'd buy it, said Jack, for
$4,000. Not a dime less than five, said the shop. Not a dime more than four,
answered Jack. Faced with this impasse, Jill reckoned fast. After all, a
whole mink coat was better than none. Out of Jack's hearing, she assured
the shop she would pay the difference, and persuaded it to sell to Jack ostensibly at his price. The ruse worked like a charm. Jack signed the saleslip, probably convinced he had won a hard bargain. The shop then delivered the coat to him. He promptly delivered it to Jill, with appropriate
words of gift.
The very next day Jill paid the shop the difference in price, as she had
agreed. She then left the coat to be monogrammed, that she might henceforth be clothed with the indicia of ownership. The shop was unaware that
in the past twenty-four hours there had been grave damage to her delicate
relationship with the donor. There is no known way of ringing such
changes on saleslips.
Then the fur began to fly. Later in the day Jack stormed into the shop,
declaring that he had revoked his gift, that the coat Was his, and that he
would pay the $4,000 only if the shop delivered it to him. This the shop
refused to do. Thereafter, Jill marched in and demanded that the coat be
delivered to her. When the shop again refused, offering instead to refund
the $1,000 she had paid, Jill sued for conversion. The shop then filed a cu1242 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1957).

"Earl v. Saks & Co., 36 Cal. 2d 602, 226 P.2d 340 (1951).
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rious "Cross-Complaint in Interpleader," demanding affirmative relief
against either or both of the other sides of the triangle. It was willing to
deliver to either, on assurance of payment in full, but it had to be one or
the other. It wisely knew that neither Jack nor Jill would regard a divided
mink coat as better than none. As for the shop, it preferred money to
mink. When Jack sought to rescind the contract, it demanded enforcement
of his promise to pay $4,000 for a coat whose quality was not in dispute.
It was a going concern, not a warehouse for mink returned by gentlemen
customers. The law of contracts was at stake. The burning issue was
whether a shop that had secretly agreed with a girl to expedite a sale to her
escort could justifiably rely on its contract of sale with him.
The trial court refused to believe that but for the secret side agreement,
Jack would not have bought the coat. His offer to pay no more than $4,000
might well encourage a helpful girl to pave the way for him to pay just
that and thus realize his dream of a hard bargain. The trial court found
that it was not too likely that the spirit of giving a $5,000 mink at a cost
of $4,000 would be extinguished by knowledge of the enterprising scheme
that facilitated the execution of the gift.
Moreover, counsel at the trial made it clear that what troubled Jack was
not Jill's connivance with the shop, but her alleged dalliance with others:
[Hie told her in effect that if she wanted to reciprocate his affection and
would give up running around with other men and give them a chance to
see whether or not they might be able to mature their affection, he would be
very pleased to give her suitable gifts, a token of his esteem and regard....
[O]n the very evening of this gift . . . [he] became confronted with the
reality that the young lady wasn't telling him the truth about things, she
wasn't keeping appointments and on the contrary was misleading him about
her plans ... and when that realization came upon him he felt that he wanted
to interrupt the giving of the gift.14
Despite the trial court's findings, justifying enforcement of the sales
contract between the shop and the purchaser, the plot grew thicker. On
appeal, Jack sought a reversal, apparently on the theory that the shop was
fraudulent in not advising him that he was getting more for his money
than he had bargained for. A knowledgeable lamb had closed the gap between a bullish offer and his bearish counter-offer, making the latter acceptable. Plainly he did not rue his bargain with the shop until his friend
allegedly broke whatever bargain she made with him in return for suitable
tokens of esteem. Counsel suggested that she could not justifiably rely on
mink as a gift. There was a distinct implication that such a token of esteem could be reclaimed whenever there was a change in the esteem.
And once reclaimed, what to do with the mink? It was caught in a vicious triangle. Since Jack had wrongly appraised the future with Jill, he
now retroactively evaluated the transaction with the shop. He succeeded
on appeal in persuading a majority of the court that he could justifiably
rely on rescission as a remedy against the shop that had unbeknownst to
him given him the best of a good bargain.
14

Id. at 614, 226 P.2d at 348.
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The contrary view I took has only the fleeting life of a dissent:
It was for the trial court to determine whether [he] was a man of such
temperament that he would have preferred having [her] get along without
the fur coat to accepting her contribution toward its purchase. He declared
his love for her, expressing the sentiment several times that he wanted to

give her a fur coat. She was 'very much in love with the coat and wanted
it badly.' It was important to him that the woman he loved possess the coat;
it was important to her to possess it. Her contribution enabled him to
fulfill his wish and hers at a price he was willing to pay. Since they were
both fur-coat-minded, it is a reasonable inference that he would not have
risked disturbing the relationship between them by depriving her of the coat
because she was willing to contribute toward its purchase.
Counsel at the trial made it clear that [he] sought recission of the sale
because [she] failed to live up to his expectations. This failure can in no way
be attributed to [the company]. Its coat was of sound quality and came up
to [her] expectations. The court properly rejected [his] offer of proof of his
expectations and disappointment. Not only were they no concern of [the
company], but no issue was raised in the pleadings regarding his arrangements
with [her]."
Nevertheless even a dissenter can resign himself to the contrary majority
opinion. The law's tolerance of sales promotion can be sorely tried by sales
so consummated.
The question of whether reliance is justifiable puts legal reasoning to the
test, whether the contract deals with mink or with more down-to-earth
matters. When the down-to-earth paving bid of a subcontractor raised the
question in my state,'" it soon became apparent that the few precedents on
comparable problems offered no ready solution to the instant case.
Consider the facts in the context of case law, and ask yourselves at the
outset whether you would have appraised the plaintiff's case as a lost cause
or not so lost. Be warned at the outset, however, that you will not pave
your way to an acceptable opinion with good intentions; you must stand
ready at every step of the way to explain why no other way will do.
Be warned, because the facts are so simple that you may wonder how
they could possibly prove baffling to a court. A subcontractor submitted a
bid to a contractor to do paving for some $7,000. The contractor relied
thereon in drawing up his own bid, which was accepted. The subcontractor
then revoked his bid and refused to do the paving for less than $15,000.
The contractor, despite his best efforts to mitigate damages, succeeded only
in engaging another subcontractor to do the paving for nearly $11,000.
The contractor accordingly sued the first subcontractor for damages.
It is just such innocuous facts that beget the most diabolic questions of
law. No matter what your status as a lawyer, whether a senior partner or
an apprentice, you would find no Shephard to guide you surefootedly from
the facts to the law. Of course you would be taking a second look at the
facts with the second sight of a lawyer; but then your troubles would really begin. There was no evidence that the defendant offered to make his bid
irrevocable in consideration of plaintiff's using in the computation of his
own bid the figures that the defendant had submitted. Rarely can one
15 Id.

at 614-15, 226 P.2d at 347-48.
"eDrennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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count on defendants to plan their activities so providentially as to expedite
the invocation of an appropriate magic word like irrevocability.
If the subcontractor had not made an irrevocable bid, was there a bilateral contract binding on both parties? The answer to that was "No."
What then remained of the subcontractor's bid, in legal terms? The evidence indicated that it was reasonable for plaintiff contractor to rely on
the defendant subcontractor's bid, and that he did not delay accepting that
bid after being awarded the general contract, in the hope of getting a
lower bid. Still, the subcontractor had made no promise to hold his bid
open, though neither had he reserved the right to revoke.
Did it end the problem to say that the subcontractor's bid was an offer
for a bilateral contract? Or was that only the starting-point of the problem? What would you do if you said that the subcontractor's bid was an
offer for a bilateral contract, period, and questions kept bobbing their
heads? The subcontractor's offer for a bilateral contract had much in common with an offer for a unilateral contract. As to a unilateral contract, the
theory had already developed that "the main offer includes as a subsidiary
promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested performance is
given, the offeror will not revoke his offer" and that the consideration
rendering this implied promise enforceable is the part performance."
The theory implied that an offer emerges to the point of no return as
an enforceable quid for a given quo, even though the parties never literally
struck a bargain. As with many another construction in the law designed
to preclude injustice, this theory of implied promise is ingeniously contained within conventional terminology, the shorthand of magic words.
Whatever its orthodox language, this implication of promise was contrived
to give effect, not to a considered bargain, but to the justifiable expectations of the parties. It thus tacitly opened the way for a shift in emphasis
from the language of bargain and consideration, the speech of peppercorn, to the language of reliance as a basis for implying an enforceable
subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer. The real significance of part
performance is not that it may be construed as consideration in the conventional bargain sense to render enforceable an implied promise, but that
it can be identified realistically as one form of reliance.
Was it not then possible for other forms of justifiable reliance likewise
to call up an implied promise and render it enforceable? We advanced to
the analogy, in the offer for a bilateral contract such as the subcontractor's
bid, that reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change
in position affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke. We could not equate this form of reliance with bargained-for consideration as the reliance evinced by part performance had
been equated. It was plaintiff's reliance that served to make the subcontractor's offer irrevocable, even though there was no consideration in the
sense of bargain, "in the sense of something that is bargained for and given
in exchange."'"
17RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45, comment b (1932).
" 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 194, at 192 (1963).
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Our analysis brought us sharply against the question-begging word,
consideration. Once again, we had been compelled to consider what we
mean by a magic word. We could understand anew the words of Professor Corbin, in his great work on contracts, that "the reasons for enforcing
informal promises are many, that the doctrine of consideration is many
doctrines, that no definition can rightly be set up as the one and only correct definition, and that the law of contract is an evolutionary product
that has changed with time and circumstance and that must ever continue
so to change."'"
So it proved with the case of reliance upon a paving bid. The solution
of that case combined the theory of implied promise in section 45 of the
Restatement of Contracts with the theory of promissory estoppel or reliance set forth in section 90. If in the process of evolution the peppercorn
suffered one more diminution of status, few would dispute that it had long
evinced no sign of growth other than growing tinier.
Even as some things in the law have been growing tinier, some formerly
hardly visible people in the law have grown enough to provoke comment,
not all of it scholarly. Among them are women, a small but nonetheless significant majority of our people. At long last, but only in this century,
they have obtained the right to vote, the right to work in many places once
denied to them, the right not to work more than eight hours a day in
many occupations, and even the right to make their own contracts. There
is no end in sight to their rising expectations. They seem to be able to tend
to their business affairs as well as they once tended the stove, and many of
them are now buying their own minks, without any consideration for bargains.
It was only a matter of time that the law would recognize that such new
freedoms must be attended by new responsibilities. Others may describe
how far their jurisdictions have gone in this respect. I shall summon only
one illustration from my own, and you may agree that this no longer lost
cause should not have remained lost so long.
Once again a fin de siMe case was the root of the trouble. In 1889 the
rule was established that when spouses conspire only between themselves,
they cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy."0 The rule was a direct descendant of the common-law fiction that a husband and wife are one person, a
fiction fostered by Blackstone." The supposed merger precluded
their pros2
ecution for conspiracy, which requires two or more persons. 2
There was no orderly procession of cases, as in the problem of forfeiture,
to compel re-examination of the rule, and so it survived by default. Seventy-five years went by. Then, in 1964, the People appealed from an order
of the trial court dismissing a charge that a husband and wife had conspired to violate the Corporations Code and to commit grand theft.2 The
People were not persuaded by the argument that a husband and wife
1 id. § 109, at 489.
2 People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 22 P. 934 (1889).
21 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; 2 BLACKSTONE
'90

22

CAL. PENAL

CODE

COMMENTARIES

*433.

§ 182 (1957).

'aPeople v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
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should be granted immunity in the interest of their domestic harmony. Nor
were the People persuaded that a husband and wife could put their heads
together to criminal purpose and still be assured immunity under the fiction that spousehood was a merger in which the wife disappeared as an
entity.
The court likewise was not persuaded. It noted that the law posed no
threat to the domestic harmony of the spouses in lawful pursuits. It added
that "[i]t would be ironic indeed if the law could operate to grant them
absolution from criminal behavior on the ground that it was attended by
close harmony."24 The court also renounced the supposed merger of spouses
in spousehood, declaring: "The fictional unity of husband and wife has
been substantially vitiated by the overwhelming evidence that one plus one
adds up to two, even in twogetherness." '
One marginal note speaks volumes about Texas. In 1905, a Texas court
looked askance at the rule that a husband and wife cannot be prosecuted
for conspiracy' and rejected the rule outright in 1942,27 coming in second
after Colorado's judicial rejection in 1920.21 Since then, the rule has also
been rejected by Illinois"' and by the United States Supreme Court.' Texas
may take pride in the fact that for a long time it was a lone star in questioning the fictional merger of husband and wife as stranger than the
truth.
Even today the battle for the duality of twogetherness is far from won.
It is taking longer to end the adverse consequences of such original virtue
as fictional oneness than to end the adverse consequences of such original
sin as we noted earlier in the forfeiture cases.
Having taken the jump from California to Texas, we now travel back
again, not for provincial reasons, but to take sight from a strategic location
of some not so lost causes in conflict of laws. The French have a euphemistic term for it, private international law, that shifts the emphasis from
conflicts to solutions whose repercussions may be felt around the nation or
even around the world. However designated, this branch of the law appears to intimidate many. A few years ago, in an essay on conflicts,s' I
used hardy language at the outset to encourage the reader's consideration.
It was amazing to discover later that the editors, apparently in terror of
the subject, had substituted their own opening sentence, which reads "Conflict of laws is one of the2 most hazardous of subjects, and it is with hesitation that I approach it.")
A judge must disown such uncharacteristic words; if he hesitated before
hazardous subjects, he would be lost. Whoever reads beyond that pale and
24 Id. at 881,

395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.

2 Id. at 880, 395 P.2d at 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
21 Smith v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 233, 239-40, 89 S.W. 817, 820-21 (1905).
27
Marks v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 509, 514, 164 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1942).
28
Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 47, 189 P. 37, 38 (1920).
29 People v. Martin, 4 Ill.2d 105, 109, 122 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1954).
2 United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1960).
21 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959),
3 id.
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trembling sentence, no brainchild of mine and unfit for adoption, will
come upon quite different words. "There is no problem so extraordinary,"
I wrote, "as to defy thinking about the ordinariness underlying the extra.

It may hearten you to know that here and there judges have come to notice
that conflict of laws, far from huddling in esoteric passes, exists for anyone to see in many a mundane situation that never even comes to court because no lawyers happen to be about with seeing eyes."'
Obviously there can be no case law without cases. Even when cases did

arise, the briefs in the main brought little enlightenment to the courts beyond the pitch-white of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, whose
unrealistic rules were akin to little fences that supposedly insured a place
for everything, and everything in its place.
It is not easy for a judge thus bounded by a Restatement and the restating briefs to see for himself how things really are. Actually things were
in a state-whichever state could be most readily boxed into the magic
words of the Restatement. For all their authority, however, the magic
words crazed the far from numerous decisions. Though no one is born
baffled in conflict of laws, most have achieved bafflement early or have had
it thrust upon them. Baffling, said the judges; ' baffling, said the lawyers;
swamp, said the professors;' and Echo answered, lex loci.'
Echo's answering service was of supreme simplicity, but not less confounding for that. It evinced little concern to develop fair and rational
answers comparable to those developing in other branches of the law. For
all the outward stability of lex loci conclusions, all was turmoil inside the
premises. Still, unfamiliarity bred consent. Conflicts seemed far enough removed from the ordinary life of the law that few were heard to say,
though a few did say it,"7 that the premises were unsound.
Things went from bad to worse as boundary lines proved to be cobwebs.
More and more people packed up their troubles in one state and unpacked
them in another. More and more workers and enterprises looked for green
in faraway fields. If they were hurt along the way, they might be still more
deeply hurt in court. In the depressing case of Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby,"6 in 1912, an injured plaintiff's cause was lost on the ground that it was
governed by the law of the place of the tort. By 1956, time had marched
on. In Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co." an injured plaintiff's cause
was lost because he failed to prove that it was not lost under the law of
the place of the tort. When time marched on, it did not stop for any
wounded who could not carry in their burden of proof the nuggets of lex
loci delicti. There were erratic results. The nuggets could be as heavy as
boulders. They could also be of lighter weight, though they might still
prove troublesome to carry.
33Id.
4

See,

e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928).
e.g., Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
" See Traynor, Book Review, 1965 DUKE L.J. 426.
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5See,
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See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
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'9233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
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Still, there was a plaintiff injured far from home who came into court
with a cause that was not lost. The time was 1953; the case was Grant v.
McAuliffe.' Two cars had collided in Arizona. All parties were residents of
California. Plaintiffs, the driver of one car and his two passengers, sued
the administrator of the estate of the driver of the other car, who died of
his injuries. California permitted the survival of tort actions; Arizona did
not. Under the policy of California, damages for personal injuries were
compensatory. Its survival statute implements that policy by subordinating
the interests of the decedent's heirs, legatees, devisees, and creditors to the
interests of the injured person. California contacts were more than sufficient to give the state an interest in applying its policy. Not only were
the parties residents of California, but the decedent's estate was being administered in California.
The Supreme Court of California parted with the Restatement by expressly rejecting the law of the place of wrong. It applied California law
and allowed recovery. Had it mechanically invoked the law of the place of
wrong, it would have made an exception to the local law. To do so would
have defeated a legitimate interest of the forum state without serving the
interest of any other state. Even though Arizona had a policy giving preference over injured claimants to heirs, legatees, devisees, and creditors of an
estate, there was no indication that it had any contact with the case other
than the fortuitous occurrence of the accident in Arizona, hardly sufficient
to give it an interest in the application of its policy.
In this light, there was no real conflict of laws in the case. Now it became apparent that the wooden rules of lex loci delicti compelled distorted
reasoning in terms of spurious conflict. As in the Cabinet of Dr. Caligari,
one saw lunacy at last in what had appeared to be eminently sane. It was
not the plaintiffs alone who had suffered injury and then been denied redress. The law, too, had suffered.
Grant v. McAuliffe broke the spell of magic words, though it had the
clumsiness of a pioneer breaking through a facade and entering upon a derelict area with no clear directions as to where to begin the clearing. At the
time, the choice was between a clumsy clearing or none. It would have
been pleasant indeed to write a perceptive opinion of new vistas while
someone else did the clearing. It seemed, however, that most everybody
had a previous engagement to coast on the Cuban railroad.
Confusion was worse confounded in a conflict-of-laws problem that involved family relationships. Soon after the Grant case, such a problem
arose in Emery v. Emery." An accident in Idaho involved California domiciliaries. A car overturned as it was being driven by a boy, under his father's direction. His two sisters were injured, and they sued their father
and their brother. Normally there would have been liability under the
laws of either Idaho or California, given the findings of gross negligence.
There remained the question of immunity as between family members.
The court determined first that California law governed the capacity to sue
4041 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944

(1953).
4'45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
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and to be sued. Thereafter it set precedents in domestic tort law. It held
that an unemancipated minor may sue his parent for a willful or malicious
tort. It held that one sibling can likewise sue another.
Once again it bears noting that we can hardly take such rules for
granted. Some ten years ago when the court established them, it was impelled to elucidate why the orthodox rules were not tenable. In answer to
the argument that parental immunity from suit is essential to parental
discipline, the judicial opinion observed that a parent's wide discretion in
discipline does not include the right willfully to inflict personal injuries beyond reasonable limits. In answer to the argument that actions against
siblings or parents would disrupt family harmony, the opinion observes
that an uncompensated tort is not likely to preserve the peace of the family. One by one the opinion dealt with an array of arguments of more
sound than reason, arriving at last to the rules that won the day for the
children.
This children's crusade in torts overshadowed the preliminary problems
as to conflict of laws. Not long after, there arose a case involving a conflict pure and complicated as to adults."2 There was the sound of music in
the air, martial music. One could almost hear a crash of cymbals denoting
the clash of conflicting laws. Two groups of musicians attacked the validity
of collective bargaining contracts that included trust agreements between
their employers and their collective bargaining agent, the American Federation of Musicians. The gist of their complaint was that the Federation,
in violation of its duty as an agent and in fraud of their rights, contracted
with the employers to have certain royalty payments and payments for
re-use of motion pictures on television paid to a trustee for specified trust
purposes rather than directly to the employee musicians. Plaintiffs viewed
these payments as wages that could not be diverted to the trust. They contended that the national officers of the Federation arranged the trust to
maintain their hold over the affairs of the Federation and to perpetuate
themselves in office.
There was personal service on the trustee in New York. Was it sufficient
to give the court in California jurisdiction to adjudicate his right to receive payments under the contracts?
It was one thing to reduce the issue to these simple words and quite another to resolve it in tune with orthodox pronouncements that made such
a big thing of in rem. In a mobile society where more and more property
becomes intangible, the distinctions between in rem and in personam become stranger and stranger. Though a liberalized interpretation of the due
process clause now affords state courts an enlarged jurisdiction over nonresidents with the requisite minimum contacts, state statutes that prattle
of in rem or impose dated tests continue to plague the courts.
Plaintiffs had asked for a declaratory judgment that would have the
effect of terminating the trustee's interest in the trust res, namely, the employers' payments into the trust, contending that the payments should go
to the musicians. There were enough contacts with the state to justify in
42Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960

(1957).
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personam jurisdiction under the due process clause. Under the local statute,
however, the court had jurisdiction only over the employers and the Federation of Musicians, but not over the trustee. Could there then be jurisdiction quasi-in-rem to decide between the interests of the plaintiffs and
trustee in the intangible property in question? Could the trust res be
deemed "property in the state" under a statute governing actions relating
to local real or personal property in which a nonresident defendant claims
an interest?
The court noted that in actions involving intangibles it could take jurisdiction for some purposes without personal jurisdiction over all the parties. It seemed as irrational to resolve the problem by assigning a fictional
situs to intangibles as it would be to pin a tail blindfolded to a nonexistent donkey. Instead, the problem was recognized as one of jurisdiction
over persons and property. It was resolved in terms of the interacting elements of the parties' contacts with the forum state, the interests of the
states concerned in the outcome, and the pervading concept of fair play to
all parties.
All of the parties had substantial contacts with California, the forum
state. Plaintiffs were residents of California. The payments in question allegedly represented their wages for work in California. The major elements
of the transaction were in California. The trustee had brought himself into
this essentially local transaction by accepting the trust. Under conventional
choice of law rules, California law would govern the question whether
plaintiffs' wages could be diverted to the trustee.
California afforded an eminently convenient forum. Fairness to plaintiffs demanded that they be able to reach the fruits of their labors before
they were removed from the state. The defendant employers and the defendant Federation of Musicians were within the personal jurisdiction of
the court. Fairness to them demanded a final adjudication of the conflicting claims of the plaintiffs and the trustee.
It would hardly have been realistic to hold that in light of the trustee's
absence, there could be no declaratory judgment that would terminate his
interest. Plaintiffs could then still have asserted that the employers' payments to the trustee would not discharge their obligation to plaintiffs.
Moreover, they could have asserted that the Federation of Musicians would
likewise be independently liable for damages for breach of its fiduciary
duty. The employers would then have been subject to multiple actions,
one by the plaintiffs and the other by the trustee, with the attendant risk
of double liability.
The case graphically illustrates that even when a court has jurisdiction
under the due process clause, it may be hampered by a local statute. The
statute precluding a personal judgment unless the defendant was a resident at the time of suit ruled out the possibility of a judgment against the
trustee that would hold him liable for a breach of trust or compel him to
make an accounting. At most, the court could determine only his interest
in the trust res under another statute authorizing the determination of a
nonresident's interest in property in the state.
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Plainly the legislature did not regard a judgment under this statute as
a personal judgment such as was precluded by the other statute. Yet such
a judgment would affect the rights of persons as any judgment does, and
the jurisdiction question is not allayed simply by regarding the proceeding
as in rem. The case demonstrated the need for realistic tests to determine
jurisdiction.
Insofar as courts remain given to asking "res, res-who's got the res?,"
they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should determine jurisdiction. Only when they give up the ghost of the res will the gap narrow
between the tests of jurisdiction and the tests of forum non conveniens.
Once these begin to converge, they would tend to absorb choice-of-law
tests. Such an outcome would be in the interest of rational law, for the
state whose law controls is the one whose courts would normally be best
qualified to interpret and apply it.
The not so lost causes we have sketched illustrate that no man can put
asunder fact and law. Though an appellate judge is regularly haunted by
the question of whether the facts before him constitute the whole truth,
his legal reasoning necessarily proceeds from those facts. Sometimes the
most difficult facts are the indisputable ones, such as an inept or inadequate
statute that plainly means its foolishness. Since statutes now constitute the
bulk of our law, it is more important than ever that their drafting evince
brain as well as brawn. So great is the force of habit, however, that the
watchbirds of the law, the scholarly commentators, have hardly begun to
train their eyes on the legislative process as they traditionally have on the
appellate process. I have summed up the consequences elsewhere as "The
Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress." ' The need is urgent for a
signal corps that will take note of these unguarded affairs. Only thereby
can we minimize the risk that good causes will be lost in court for lack of
a nail in a statute of ponderous horsepower.
We noted at the outset the abundant discussion on the great legal issues
of the day, including constitutional questions of historic dimension. This
brief survey has concentrated instead on less dramatic cases, for the orderly
resolution of all cases is essential to the rational development of the law.
By definition, the towering landmarks that mark the victorious causes are
few in number. There might be none in the realm of reason we call the law,
if there were not also many other markers along the way.

41113 U. PA. L. RLy, 485 (1965).

